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Jenna Stimac
Apprentice
28 Posts |
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Eliott Dimond
Fledgling
19 Posts |
 Posted - May 23 2010 : 9:58:47 PM
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| Jenna, if you go back to what Tom said -- "we don't know everything that's true, of course, but everything we know is true" -- that makes your questions more interesting, I think. If we think we know something is true, that knowledge will be inconsistent because we don't know everything. The knowledge that is consistent would be the truth, and the truth is going to always be consistent. So maybe knowledge can lead to the truth, and the truth is consistent but knowledge itself is not going to necessarily be consistent. |
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Megan Lane
Newcomer
3 Posts |
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Joseph Haag
Moderator
172 Posts |
Posted - May 24 2010 : 6:32:49 PM
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Wow! I'm so sorry I've only now gotten in on the discussion. There has been so much good, interesting stuff brought up already that I don't even know where to begin.
One thing that I want to bring up myself is this. There has been a lot of talk here about knowledge and wisdom. A lot of people don't seem inclined to say wisdom and knowledge are the same thing. Well, neither am I. Pope John Paul II once said that philosophy took a turn for the worse when it stopped being about wisdom and started being about getting an answer. He says that first, the result was over-confidence. Philosophers thought they could get answers about anything. Soon, however, that confidence turned into skepticism. Suddenly, the only thing that we did know was the fact that we couldn't get an answer about anything. This is, no doubt, a bit of a caricature but it still makes an interesting point. More importantly, it speaks volumes about the difference between wisdom and an answer. Assuming that getting an answer and obtaining knowledge are the same thing, we can see what the problems are with knowledge.
I've thought a fair amount about this topic myself. If I were to have to hazard personal definitions of "wisdom" and "knowledge," I'd have to say this.
Knowledge is, for me, an answer that you have. I really want to stress that it's something you have. For me, knowledge is almost an aggregate of ideas. Ideas are mental images in your mind.
Wisdom, however, is something with which you undergo an experience. "To undergo an experience with something -- be it a thing, a person or a god -- means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms us and transforms us" (Martin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language" in On The Way to Language 57). In other words, to undergo an experience with wisdom is not the same as simply having an idea or a mental image in your mind.
I think that the crucial difference is this. Wisdom is indeterminate. When I say indeterminate, I mean that its limits are not finely set. Knowledge, if it really is just an idea that you have in your head, is contained within very fine, set limits. But wisdom isn't. It dwells in limits that are not known to us. It comes to us from afar and strikes us. |
Edited by - Joseph Haag on May 24 2010 6:35:09 PM |
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Christine Gylling
Fledgling
18 Posts |
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Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin
1368 Posts |
Posted - May 25 2010 : 06:59:27 AM
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Christine, leaving aside for right now the opening sentence of your post, which you're going to have to clarify for us, the rest of what you say here strikes me as exactly right, provided we understand "consistency" as referring to logical consistency, which is a property of statements or propositions (see definitions 3-6 on p. 12 of "Arguments and Their Evaluation") and therefore also a property of beliefs (since every belief is expressible in the form of a statement or, to put the point in another way: every belief is a belief in the truth of some proposition). I want to comment on what you've said here in some detail, since I think you've made a really huge contribution to the discussion with these remarks, but I can't do it right now. I'll get back to this thread a little later on this morning.
Joe, regarding the definition of "knowledge" that you've hazarded, doesn't it imply that it's possible to know things that are false? Are you all right with that? |
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Joseph Haag
Moderator
172 Posts |
Posted - May 25 2010 : 08:49:16 AM
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| Well, haven't we always "known" that the law of non-contradiction was true? However, that's only true in the right situations. Bertrand Russel's set theory paradox is one situation in which it isn't true. |
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Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin
1368 Posts |
Posted - May 25 2010 : 09:19:59 AM
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Let's not have any quotation marks here. To stick them in in the way that you have is to change the subject. To say that we've always "known" that the law of contradiction is true is simply to say that we've always thought we knew it to be true.
It is of course possible to think (mistakenly) that you know things that are false, but is it possible to know anything that's false? That's the question. |
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Joseph Haag
Moderator
172 Posts |
Posted - May 25 2010 : 11:26:42 AM
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| Sorry about the quotation marks. I admit I'm stumped here. I don't know what to say about that. |
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Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin
1368 Posts |
Posted - May 25 2010 : 12:46:04 PM
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Nearly all contemporary philosophers regard it as analytic that for any subject S and any proposition p, if S knows that p, then p is true. Of course, I offer this merely as a piece of information, not as an argument, since as an argument, it'd be a really blatant appeal to authority. It follows, though, from what's often called "the traditional definition of knowledge" (often thought to be a definition that can be traced back to Plato's Theaetetus) namely this:
S knows that p if and only if (1) S believes that p; (2) p is true; and (3) S is justified in believing that p.
From this it follows that if S knows that p, then S believes that p (though the converse, of course, is plainly false). It also follows that if S knows that p, then p is true (though the converse of this is also plainly false). Finally, it follows that if S knows that p, S is justified in believing that p (though the converse of this, too, is false, for consider the fact that while if one is justified in believing some proposition, he or she is plainly justified in believing all its logical consequences, no one does in fact believe all the logical consequences of any given proposition simply because (a) they are infinite in number, and (b) they include propositions far too complex for any human being to be able to understand). |
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Katie Contreras
Apprentice
29 Posts |
Posted - May 25 2010 : 12:58:37 PM
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I was reading through the posts, and saw a couple by people who think that the Socrates' decision not to promise to stop doing what he was doing because he wanted to stay a philosopher helped him to stay consistent and in turn made his decision-making easier. I don't believe that to be true. We may make decisions daily and remain consistent in making the decisions we make, but it doesn't make the decision-making any easier. For example, summer school. I may have a friend who will ask if I want to go out for the night, and this could be the fifth time, and I could have said no each time including this night; but it won't necessarily be any easier than it was before, and if anything I think that it might well become more and more difficult to keep saying no. I also don't see how this theory relates to knowledge. How is any knowledge gained merely by making decisions, and how is the whole question of the relation between knowledge and consistency related to consistency's making it easier to make decisions, as some of you seem to believe?
Also, I was reading your recent posts, Joe, and I do agree with most of your definitions, especially the wisdom one. But again I am wondering how you relate what you said to what consistency has to do with knowledge? I see how you've related knowledge and wisdom, and I'm not sure if I missed how you linked consistency and knowledge, so I am just wondering what your take on it is?
Christine I really like what you said in your last sentence in your last post "Knowledge requires consistency and without consistency, knowledge is impossible." I agree with this completely.
[Very lightly edited to enhance readability -TT] |
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Joseph Haag
Moderator
172 Posts |
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Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin
1368 Posts |
Posted - May 25 2010 : 2:24:00 PM
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| Folks, I've amplified the response I made earlier today (at 12:46 p.m.) to the things that Joe posted at 8:49 and 11:26 this morning. That post has to do entirely with the relation between knowledge and truth. The definition of logical consistency is one that can be spelled out in terms of possible truth, and so the two together will provide us with a way of seeing the relation between logical consistency and knowledge, which is what I promised Christine I'd get back to in the post I made just before 7:00 this morning. I said in it that I'd get back later in the morning. Things have intervened, but by golly I'll return to this topic and make good on my promise before the end of the day today! In the meantime, think about the last line of Christine's post, my immediate response to that, what I posted at 12:46 this afternoon (along with what I subsequently added to it), and my question to Joe about whether it's possible to know things that aren't true. That'll get you primed for what I'll be posting ere long. |
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Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin
1368 Posts |
Posted - May 25 2010 : 8:13:51 PM
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OK, I'm back. Here's the rest of the promised comment on Christine's really important insight.
Let me start with the last thing in what Christine posted at 11:51 last night: "Knowledge requires consistency, and without consistency, knowledge is impossible." This is absolutely right if what we mean by "consistency" here is logical consistency, and here's the proof. First, for a single statement or proposition p:- If I know that p, p is true.
- If p is true, it's possible for p to be true.
- But p is logically consistent just in case it's possible for p to be true.
- Therefore, if I know that p, p is logically consistent.
Next, for a set of statements or propositions A:- If I know everything in A, then everything in A is true.
- If everything in A is true, it's possible for everything in A to be true.
- But A is logically consistent just in case it's possible for everything in A to be true.
- Therefore, if I know everything in A, A is logically consistent.
The first proposition in each of these proofs is the one I talked about in my post of 12:46 p.m. today. I regard it as non-controversial, but if you have any doubts about it, by all means express them. These "proofs" won't really prove anything to you at all unless you know that their premises are true.
The second proposition is each of these proofs is trivial, but crucial to make the inference fully explicit. The claim in each case simply depends on the fact that if a thing is actual, it must be possible. If it weren't possible, it couldn't be actual.
The third proposition is in each case one of the definitions of logical consistency I've set forth in "Arguments and Their Evaluation." In the first proof, it's definition 5 from p. 12; in the second proof, it's definition 3.
All of a sudden, Sokrates' cross-questioning procedure makes perfect sense. He gets into a conversation with someone -- anyone, but you can think here of his conversations with Meletos and Ion (I'll call this person the interlocutor) -- and starts asking him or her questions. The purpose of asking these questions is to assemble a set of things that the interlocutor actually believes to be true. As soon as an inconsistency emerges, Sokrates is in a position -- an unassailable position -- to declare that at least one of the statements must be false. Which one? Well, Sokrates will have carefully targeted one in the beginning. In the case of his cross-questioning of Meletos, it's the elements of the indictment concerning which he's going to try to put Meletos to shame, and in the case of his cross-questioning of Ion, it's the idea that Ion is able to do what he does because he possesses an art -- i.e., a particular skill that he has acquired. What Sokrates then contrives to do is to ensure that all the other beliefs he elicits from the interlocutor by means of his questioning are beliefs it's going to be even harder for the interlocutor to give up than it would be for him or for her to give up the targeted belief. Once the inconsistency is manifest (and the way Sokrates makes it manifest is by deducing a contradiction from the answers he's been given) it's clear that something's got to go. Well, what's got to go? Answer: the targeted belief. (Of course the people who are on the receiving end of this a few times may start thinking that it's Sokrates who's got to go!)
So here's what Christine has put her finger on. First, for a particular proposition to be capable of being true, it must be internally consistent (consistent with itself, i.e., not self-contradictory). Also, it must be consistent with other clearly true propositions. For a proposition to be known, it must be true. Therefore, no one can know anything that's self-contradictory, and no one can know anything that's inconsistent with other, true propositions. Therefore inconsistency in a person's beliefs is a sure sign of lack of knowledge. And of course if one can't be wise if one thinks one knows what one doesn't know, then if it turns out that one doesn't know things he or she thinks he or she knows, so much for any pretension to wisdom.
Study it up, folks. It's crucial that you all understand all the details here.
And note: none of this has anything to do at all with consistency in the first of the senses explained by Jenna near the beginning of this thread. The whole point of Sokrates' method is to force people to change their minds, to stop consistently saying the things they've been mindlessly saying -- the things the logical inconsistencies in which have now been laid bare! |
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Katie Contreras
Apprentice
29 Posts |
Posted - May 26 2010 : 9:31:14 PM
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| So, what you're saying is that if someone can't stay consistent in what he or she believes then that makes him or her unknowledgeable, because he or she isn't consistent with it and therefore can't be too knowledgeable about that belief? I'm not sure if I'm understanding completely. |
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Will Emmons
Moderator
47 Posts |
Posted - May 27 2010 : 01:30:55 AM
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Katie, with posts like Tom's last, I try to get into the habit of reading them over and over again, stopping to think about them as I go, so as to really get them into my head. He's not talking about what you're talking about. What you're talking about isn't logical consistency. Logical consistency isn't the same thing as consistency of anything -- one's conduct, one's beliefs, anything -- over time.
To all,
If a set of statements is a logically consistent set of statements then it is possible that all the statements in that set are true. And if all statements of that set are true then it is possible for someone to know that they're all true.
If a set of statements is a logically inconsistent set of statements then it is not possible for all the statements in that set to be true. And if not all statements of that set are true then it is not possible for anyone to know that they're all true.
What does consistency guarantee? The possibility of truth. But wait...the possibility of truth? If that is what it guarantees, then in looking for inconsistencies, Socrates is examining his interlocutor's statements so as to see if what he or she is saying is even capable of being true. But that's not all! Consistency also guarantees the possibility of knowledge. Since everything that is known is true and everything that is true is consistent, everything that is consistent can (in principle) be true, and everything that is true can (in principle) be known.
If all sculptors know both the best and the worst sculptures, then if I am a "sculptor" who in fact knows only the best sculptures, then what follows? That I am not a sculptor, for I do not know the worst sculptures. Of course if I really am a sculptor who knows only the best sculptures, then it isn't true that all sculptors know both the best and the worst sculptures. Finally, if all sculptors know both the best and the worst sculptures, and I am a sculptor, then I do know the worst sculptures whether I think I do or not. But what can I say of myself if I have said all three of these things -- (1) all sculptors know both the best and the worst sculptures; (2) I am a sculptor; and (3) I know the best sculptures, but not the worst -- they can't all be true, and therefore I can't know all three of these three things.
And would you look at all this that emerges from the mere detection of a logical inconsistency!
[Lightly edited to enhance readability -TT] |
Edited by - Will Emmons on May 27 2010 01:36:51 AM |
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Andrew Koziuk
Apprentice
34 Posts |
Posted - May 27 2010 : 11:19:21 AM
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Wow, Will. That was a very interesting post, and even though I had to read it a couple of times, I believe I see your point. I see that it's self-contradictory to say that you know all the best and worst sculptures when you also say that you know the best but not the worse sculptures. So is that what you are talking about when you say inconsistency? Because one time you are saying that you know the best and worst and at another time you are saying that you know the best but not the worst so that is inconsistency, correct? I hope I understood that correctly.
After reading the Topic Review, I started thinking about the first idea, which was that "[Sokrates is] prepared to go to his death to avoid acting, in the face of the threat of death, in a way that's inconsistent with his principles." That was in Dr. Trelogan's first post. I think you can compare this idea with Will's idea of inconsistency. Sokrates could go live a quiet life and forget about what he believes in, but he is prepared to die because this idea of going on with a life not suited for him is inconsistent with his beliefs. So, maybe consistency has to do with knowledge because you have to remain strong in what you believe in and not be inconsistent, because maybe inconsistency makes you unwise.
[Lightly edited to enhance readability -TT] |
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Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin
1368 Posts |
Posted - May 27 2010 : 12:01:35 PM
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Regarding the first paragraph of what you posted this morning, Nurse Koziuk: inconsistency in the sense of logical inconsistency, which is what Will is talking about, has nothing to do with consistency over time. The second paragraph makes no clear sense to me at all, even after editing to get rid of the major infelicities.)
PS: You gotta stop calling me "Dr. Trelogan." When you do, I'll stop calling you "Nurse Koziuk." Deal?
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Will Emmons
Moderator
47 Posts |
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Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin
1368 Posts |
Posted - May 27 2010 : 12:45:20 PM
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| Hey, not only do I respond to the name "Tom." I prefer it. |
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Consistency: What's It Got to Do with Knowledge?
