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Amanda Marston
Moderator
12 Posts |
 Posted - Oct 08 2012 : 1:47:10 PM
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I have read the chapter on the Paralogisms a few times, but I keep getting stuck on Kant's discussion of the "I think." Does Kant think that we are unable to infer anything at all from this proposition, or does he think that it is not a proposition at all (I am thinking of the "cogito, ergo sum")? I know he says it is "understood in a problematical sense, not in so far as it contains a perception of an existence but in regard to its mere possibility..." (A347=B405). And he mentions that we cannot be anything but the subject in relations which constitute judgments, but I think I am missing something, especially when he says, "But this proposition does not signify that I, as an object, am, for myself, a self-subsistent being or substance...perhaps not to be discovered in the thinking self at all" (B407). If it cannot be discovered there, can it be discovered at all? I have lots of questions on this section!!
[Very lightly edited to enhance readability -TT] |
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Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin
1368 Posts |
Posted - Oct 09 2012 : 10:03:41 AM
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Great questions, Amanda! I'll hazard answers if no one else does, but I'd like to give any others who have thoughts about this the opportunity to post their responses first.
But just to underline the urgency of the question as to whether the "I think" is a proposition at all, let me add the observation that in the second paragraph of the chapter (and therefore right at the outset of the entire discussion), Kant rather surprisingly characterizes the "I think" as "the concept—or, if one prefers, the judgment—I think" (A341=B399). Generally, Kant doesn't treat the terms "concept" and "judgment" as if he thinks of them as interchangeable terms in the way he seems to do here.
(PS: I've added to your original post here references to the pagination in the first and second editions for those who aren't using the Meiklejohn translation.) |
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Sergio Cerrillo
Apprentice
28 Posts |
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Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin
1368 Posts |
Posted - Oct 10 2012 : 6:35:34 PM
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| It seems to me, Sergio, that Kant quite clearly thinks that we do have the concept. Isn't it just the substantial I that he thinks may not be discoverable in the thinking self at all? |
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"I think..."
