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 PHIL 260-004 - History of Ancient Philosophy
 Can an Activity Be an Action?
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Lucinda Weber
Fledgling

6 Posts

Posted - Nov 04 2008 :  7:30:37 PM  Show Profile
From class I gathered that activity and action are two distinct things with action being more specific as to a beginning, a middle, and an end, implying time, maybe? If happiness is an activity of soul, but 'in a complete life' implies a beginning, middle and end, then can it be that an activity can also be an action?

[Lightly edited to enhance readability -TT]

Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin

1368 Posts

Posted - Nov 05 2008 :  08:42:05 AM  Show Profile
Good question, Lucinda! This makes it clear how inadequate what I said on Monday about the difference between activity and action really was. Obviously, anything that takes time but that is limited in duration has a beginning, a middle, and an end in at least this sense: it starts, it goes on for a while, and then it stops. If this is the only[ sense in which something a thing or a person does has a beginning, a middle, and an end, then it's an activity. At least part of what makes an action different is that the following three things are all true of it. (1) It doesn't just start; it has a beginning in the sense that it begins with a beginning, i.e., an opening. (2) It doesn't just go on; it unfolds. (3) It doesn't just stop; it comes to an end, i.e., to a close. It's because of this that actions cannot be interrupted prior to their completion without it's being the case that we have to say that they haven't yet been done, i.e., completed.
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Lucinda Weber
Fledgling

6 Posts

Posted - Nov 05 2008 :  9:37:03 PM  Show Profile
So then human good is an activity of the soul that cannot be deemed virtuous until death, for then only will we have the definition of it...because then only it will be completed? Just as to anything we would consider aretê, we cannot determine variants of its excellence until we know not only definitively its functions but its product?

[Edited to enhance readability -TT]
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Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin

1368 Posts

Posted - Nov 05 2008 :  10:06:34 PM  Show Profile
OK. Now I'm lost. I don't see what leads you to raise these two questions. Both seem to me to rest on misunderstandings. Let me begin with a misunderstanding I think underlies your first question: human good -- happiness -- isn't ever deemed virtuous on Aristotle's view. People are deemed virtuous or vicious, i.e., good or bad.
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Lucinda Weber
Fledgling

6 Posts

Posted - Nov 06 2008 :  7:22:20 PM  Show Profile
It's probably because I'm new to reading Aristotole and looking at just Book 7. In seeking the good in the point of self sufficiency, happiness is something final and is the end of action. So I guess I tied that in with the human good's being an activity, activity of the soul, but within a complete life. I concluded that he was referring to goodness' being function of soul, and saying that that cannot be complete until its end.

[Lightly edited to enhance readability -TT]
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Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin

1368 Posts

Posted - Nov 07 2008 :  06:49:18 AM  Show Profile
quote:
Originally posted by Lucinda Weber

Happiness is something final and is the end of action.
This means: happiness is an end--something aimed at (that's what "final" means here)--and specifically, the end of action, i.e., that at which all action ultimately aims. [In this particular context, you have to think of the term "end" as meaning what we use it to mean when we contrast ends with means.]
quote:
Originally posted by Lucinda Weber

I tied that in with the human good's being an activity, activity of the soul, but within a complete life.
As well you should have!
quote:
Originally posted by Lucinda Weber

I concluded that he was referring to goodness' being a function of soul, and saying that that cannot be complete until its end.
But I don't think this follows. First, it's happiness (eudaimonia), not goodness (aretê) that's activity (and in that sense the function [ergon]) of soul according to Aristotle. Second, he doesn't say that happiness can be complete only in a complete life. What he says is that the activity of soul in question doesn't qualify as happiness if it lasts for only a little while. It qualifies as happiness only if it lasts (goes on) throughout the natural span of an entire life. It's the individual who can reach his end (that at which he aims (whether he knows it or not) in a full life. Happiness doesn't have an end in this sense. It doesn't aim at anything. It is the end--the thing that is aimed at--in all our actions, in every deed we do.
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