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Matt Holzapfel
Apprentice
44 Posts |
 Posted - Feb 08 2007 : 1:23:37 PM
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The “Letter on Humanism” and Heidegger’s Dialectical Move:
In class on Wednesday, I tried (and, I believe, failed) to convey a thought about what is going on in the relevant sections of Being and Time regarding the essence and existence of Dasein; this interpretation was derived from my reading of Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” (to be found in Basic Writings) and it has since been strengthened by Tom’s comments on the word “Wesen” at the end of class.
I believe, furthermore, that the thought I’ve had is an avenue to getting to an understanding of what Heidegger says with Dasein. And though it is not a vital avenue (there are others that one may use as well), it is a helpful one, especially for those who’ve had some experience with Hegel—of all people. But more importantly, as is shown in Sartre’s proclamation “existence proceeds essence,” there is a danger posed to one’s understanding of Heidegger’s project, in misinterpreting his labyrinthal preparatory analysis of Dasein in such a way as to place it in the metaphysical tradition—thus making the place of Dasein that subsequently unfolds in the work entirely inaccessible.
First, I shall quote the relevant passages: quote:
The ‘essence’ [“Wesen”] of this entity lies in its “to be” [Zu-sein]. Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] {what-being?} (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia)”; ontologically, existentia is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein’s character. To avoid getting bewildered, we shall always use the Interpretative expression “presence-at-hand” for the term “existentia”, while the term “existence”, as a designation of being, will be allotted solely to Dasein.
The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not ‘properties’ present-at-hand of some entity which ‘looks’ so and so and is present at hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity possesses is primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with the term ‘Dasein’, we are not expressing its “what” (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its being.”
...
That entity which in its being has this very being as an issue, comports itself towards being in its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself.... (BT 67-68/42)
Juxtaposed to this, we have a curious statement made in the letter: quote:
…here the opposition between existential and essential is not under consideration, because neither of these metaphysical determinations, let alone their relationship, is yet in question.-Pg 229, Basic Writings
It is indeed the case that Heidegger will save his destructuring of the metaphysical tradition, which he claims in the “Letter on Humanism” to be entirely characterized by the distinction between essence and existence. But as was brought out in class (though perhaps not made apparent), Heidegger needs to introduce terms from the tradition if only to set himself apart from the tradition. He also uses terms from the tradition in creative ways that utilize their etymological connections, or employs them in contrast to their meaning in metaphysics, so as to highlight a difference. Since there aren’t any words that neatly categorize Dasein, because categorization itself is inadequate, the terms of metaphysics have to be appropriated for new purposes—and this involves their introduction and partial destructuring before the task is taken up systematically.
Still, as is shown by the quote, Heidegger is not interested in critiquing existence and essence as they are defined by the tradition and applied to what is at hand. He merely wishes to portray something that these terms do not apply to and use that something as his starting point.
Heidegger accomplishes this in two ways. First he lets the history of Wesen and its existential character speak, by pairing it off, sometimes in confrontation (a versus) and sometimes in conversation, with the very thing it used to be inextricable with, but is now sundered in rigid dichotomy. It is not necessary to go into this, as I don’t know anything more about it than what Tom said in class, which we all heard.
This leaves the second way that he uses the language of the tradition to bring us out to something outside of it. The way which Heidegger understands essentia and existentia is not made apparent in the section we’ve read in Being and Time. This explanation is only found in the “Letter on Humanism,” where Heidegger realizes the need for keeping his characterization of the tradition in the background, as he uses “existence” and “essence.”
Another quotation from the Letter is in order: quote:
Ek-sistence, thought in terms of ecstasis, does not coincide with existentia in form or content. In terms of content Ek-sistence means standing out in the truth of Being. Existentia (existence) means in contrast actualitas, actuality opposed to mere possibility as Idea….the differentiation of essentia (essentiality) and existentia (actuality) completely dominates the destiny of Western history and of all history determined by Europe.--pg 231, Basic Writings
What Heidegger means by Ek-sistence standing in the truth of being is simply beyond our scope; it is a much harder notion than any we’ve encountered in Being and Time so far, and I am personally far from understanding it, and even farther from being able to put it into words. But the rest of the quotation is of great assistance, and establishes what I named as “Heidegger’s dialectical move” in the title. I mention dialectic because in the section we've read in Being and Time, Heidegger employs two terms that begin in a dichotomy, only to be brought into mutual commerce in such a way that their difference is annihilated and they are beheld in a unity.
I would like to reiterate that the distinction itself, as it is applied to things, is not yet in question. Heidegger is now merely trying to establish Dasein, which is a something where the dichotomy, as a dichotomy, does not apply at all. He merely takes existence and essence and introduces Dasein, which is peculiar in that “essence” and “existence” apply to it in such a way that they mutually make each other. The existence of Dasein is its own possibility; its being what it is (this is the traditional understanding of essence) can only be conceived in its being.
This is not a mere inversion of a metaphysical statement, as Heidegger recognizes in Sartre’s proclamation. It does not merely invert the formula “essence precedes existence” so as to make it read: “existence precedes essence.” He knows from his experience with Nietzsche, and also by his dismissal of Marx, that mere inversion does not get one out of metaphysics at all. Indeed—it makes metaphysics more totally encompassing than it was before, moving it into an entire hemisphere where it once was not.
My connection of Heidegger’s technique in the section we’ve read to Hegel and dialectic in general is not made nonchalantly. Rather it is done because the similarities in method struck me so starkly that I could not ignore them; the method of the identity of opposites that moves us through the entire phenomenology is what gets us started in Being and Time and frames our early thinking about Dasein.
To be sure, it is already accompanied by other methods, and Heidegger is certainly not a Hegelian. But since Heidegger saw Hegel as the culmination of metaphysics it is both perfectly natural and at the same time startling that Heidegger would begin with Hegel’s method in order to find the limit that separates the proper space for metaphysics from the most accessible part of the rest of what there is—Dasein.
In the “Letter on Humanism,” metaphysics is just the simple opposition between essence and existence. This metaphysics is brought to its completed structure by the method of dialectic employed by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Logic. Heidegger gets outside of metaphysics by applying the method that completes it to the poles whose opposition creates the between of metaphysics and all that is under it.
It is indeed an awesome thing to behold, and once the dichotomy between essence and existence has collapsed for Dasein, a free void is shown—an ocean of churning abeyance—that much resembles the open region of Dasein.
[Lightly edited to improve readability —TKT] |
Edited by - Matt Holzapfel on Feb 13 2007 6:40:52 PM |
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The “Letter on Humanism” and the Dialectical Move
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