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Playdough
Fledgling
18 Posts |
 Posted - Sep 06 2005 : 9:01:34 PM
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In McKirahan pg. 162 it states in par. 1, (1) If something does not exist, we cannot know it or express it verbally, since there is no 'it' to be expressed.
then on pg. 164 par. 1 it states, ...(B). If we can coherently think of something, it is possible for that thing to exist, even if it does not.
is this a contradiction?
or are the restrictions on such thought and language which McKirahan writes of, a negation of the 2nd?
or am I just way off base? |
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Tom Trelogan
Forum Admin
1368 Posts |
Posted - Sep 07 2005 : 09:26:56 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Playdough
In McKirahan pg. 162 it states in par. 1, (1) If something does not exist, we cannot know it or express it verbally, since there is no 'it' to be [known or] expressed.
[T]hen on pg. 164 par. 1 it states, ...(B). If we can coherently think of something, it is possible for that thing to exist, even if [in fact] it does not.
[Is] this a contradiction?
[O]r are the restrictions on such thought and language which McKirahan writes of, a negation of the 2nd?
[O]r am I just way off base?
Joe,
I’m not at all sure I understand your second question, but as to your first question: these do at least look like logically incompatible claims. I don’t think this is the least bit surprising, however, since in the passage from which you quote on p. 162, McKirahan is trying to formulate Parmenides’ position on each of the various interpretations of the two ways he’s just got done laying out, whereas in the passage from which you quote on p. 164, McKirahan is trying to formulate a position with which the ordinary person, who certainly is not going to be in agreement with Parmenides on a great many things, would agree (whether for the right reason or not).
You’re doing a good job of thinking about the claims you’re encountering in the text, but you need to do more to be sure you’re clear about whose position you’re dealing with in any particular passage. In other words: you’re not way off base. Not at all. But you’re still not reading as carefully as you might. (I submit that no one ever reads as carefully as he or she might. We could all always do better.) In particular, you need to be aware of the dialectic (i.e., the dynamic of the dialogue, the conversation) that’s being presented throughout this book by McKirahan. Keep asking yourself: who’s view is this exactly? If you do, I bet lots will become clear that you may presently be having difficulty following.
One of the main things to resist if you want to make progress along these lines, is the temptation to write (say, think to yourself) "here it says...." It is never what’s speaking (whatever it is)—unless, of course, Parmenides is right!
One might grant all of the foregoing, however, and still wonder about whether the two claims you think are contradictory really are contradictory. As I’ve said, they do at least seem (at first blush) to be logically incompatible. But are they? Any logicians in the house?
Tom |
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krapula
Fledgling
16 Posts |
Posted - Sep 14 2005 : 08:26:25 AM
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I've been wrestling with that...
The two statements don't actually apply to each other all that much. The first one involves a "knowing or verbal expression," while the second only involves "coherent thinking," which is quite different. If you feel that strengthening the second statement to "If we can know something..." doesn't hurt it's integrity (verrry rough estimate), then the first statement simply makes the "even if (in fact) it does not" part irrelevant. It wouldn't really contradict it. I hope that makes a modicum of sense. |
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Parmenides: The Holographic Universe
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